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PERSPECTIVE PIECES
Throwing Precaution to the Wind:
NEPA and the Deepwater
Horizon Blowout*
Sandra Zellmer,** Joel A. Mintz,*** and Robert Glicksman**
I. Introduction
On April 20, 2010, British Petroleum's ("BP") Deepwater
Horizon oil platform exploded, killing eleven workers. When
the platform sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico two
days later, oil erupted out of the riser-a 5000-foot pipe con-
necting the platform to the well on the ocean floor. 2 Efforts
to stem the flow failed when a safety device, the "blowout
preventer," could not be activated.' Finally, after a number
of attempts to stop the leak, BP capped the well on July 15.4
Nearly five million barrels of oil were released over the course
of eighty-six days, making the Deepwater Horizon the larg-
est offshore oil spill in world history.'
This Perspective Piece uncovers some of the regulatory
failures that led to the disaster, focusing on the National
*This perspective is derived from a 2010 White Paper by the Center
for Progressive Reform. Alyson Flournoy et al., Regulatory Blowout:
How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the
System Can Be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence (2010), available at http://
www.progressivereform.org/articles/BP _ Reg Blowout 1007.pdf The
authors thank Alyson Flournoy andJames Goodwin for their leadership
on the White Paper, and we also thank Holly Doremus and Victor Flatt
for their input on the White Paper's NEPA section.
**Law Alumni Professor of Natural Resources Law, University of
Nebraska College ofLaw, and Member Scholar, Center for Progressive
Reform.
***Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center, and
Member Scholar, Center for Progressive Reform.
****JB. ' Maurice C Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The
George Washington University Law School, and Member Scholar,
Center for Progressive Reform.
1. Times Topics: Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil-spills/
gulf of mexico_2010/index.html; Henry Fountain, U.S. Says BP Well is Fi-
nally 'Dead,'N.YTiMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at Al4.
2. Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman, Oil Leaks Could Take Months to Stop,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, at All.
3. Times Topics: GulfofMexico Oil Spill, supra note 1.
4. Justin Gills & Campbell Robertson, On the Surface, Gulf Oil Spill is Vanishing
Fast; Concerns Stay, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at Al.
5. Times Topics: GulfofMexico Oil Spill, supra note 1.
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 6 and describ-
ing how the government's failure to take NEPA seriously
reveals significant flaws in the oil and gas program as a
whole. We analyze the deficiencies of the NEPA process and
suggest areas for reform, including restricting the use of tier-
ing and the availability of categorical exclusions, and requir-
ing preparation of worst-case scenarios and more thorough
consideration of indirect and cumulative effects of offshore
oil and gas leasing.7
II. NEPA and the Precautionary Principle
NEPA was the first environmental statute of the modern era,
and it remains a cornerstone of federal environmental law.'
NEPA requires federal agencies to engage in a careful analysis
of proposed projects before any actions or subsequent effects
take place.9 It is the quintessential "look before you leap"
requirement, and an elemental expression of the precaution-
ary principle in U.S. law.o NEPA is designed to achieve two
principal goals: to force agencies to factor environmental
considerations into their decisionmaking processes, particu-
larly if those agencies would otherwise be inclined to ignore
6. National Environmental PolicyAct of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
7. We leave the analysis of additional areas warranting regulatory overhaul to
other scholars. For suggestions on other necessary reforms see Flournoy et al.,
supra note *, at 4-5.
8. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, The NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct:A Review
ofIts Experiences and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'y 293 (2010); David
R. Hodas, The Role ofLaw in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Recon-
sidered, 3 WIDENER L. Symp. J. 1, 34 (1998).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
10. The precautionary principle provides that "[w]here there are threats of seri-
ous or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONE151/5/Rev.1, princ. 15 (Aug. 12, 1992).
See generally Noah Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its
Citics: The Case of Chemical Regulation, ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://www.richmond.edu/common_/files/faculty-staff-bio/law/
publications/Rescuing-theSPP-formattedAugust.pdf, David Dana, A Be-
havioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1315 (2003).
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the potential adverse impacts of their actions; and to disclose
their findings to Congress and the public."
NEPA mandates that for every "major Federal action[]
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment," the federal agency proponent prepare a detailed pub-
lic statement, known as an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS"). 1 2 The EIS must include:
* Information on the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action, available alternatives, and any adverse
effects that could not be avoided if the action were
implemented;13 and
* Disclosure of "any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources" if the action were implemented.1 4
NEPA also established the Council on Environmental
Quality ("CEQ') and authorized it "to gather timely and
authoritative information concerning the conditions and
trends in the quality of the environment both current and
prospective, [and] to analyze and interpret such informa-
tion for the purpose of determining whether such conditions
and trends are interfering, or are likely to interfere" with the
achievement of NEPA's environmentally protective policies.15
CEQ was later given the authority to develop regulations on
NEPA compliance. 6 In 1978, CEQ finalized a set of binding
regulations that apply to all federal agencies.17 The regula-
tions direct each federal agency to prepare its own specific
NEPA procedures consistent with that agency's particular
mission.s The agencies are required to identify and establish
criteria for three types of actions: (1) actions that are cat-
egorically excluded from environmental review; (2) actions
that call for the preparation of an Environmental Assessment
("EA"), which is a concise analysis used to determine whether
a full EIS is warranted; and (3) actions that require prepa-
ration of an EIS. 9 EAs are followed by either an EIS or a
"Finding of No Significant Impact" that explains why the
action will not have a significant effect on the environment. 20
Ill. The Role of NEPA in Deepwater Drilling
Offshore drilling activities, such as the ones involved in the
Deepwater Horizon spill, are regulated under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), which establishes
a four-stage oil and gas development process. 2 1 The program
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S.
752, 768 (2004).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
13. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii).
14. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(v).
15. Id. §§ 4342, 4344(2).
16. Exec. Order No. 11991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977).
17. Implementation of Procedural Provisions, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (Nov. 29, 1978)
(codified at 40 C.ER. §§ 1500-1508).
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (2010).
19. Id § 1501.4.
20. Id. §§ 1501.4, 1508.13.
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1351 (2006).
includes: (1) preparation of a nationwide five-year develop-
ment plan; (2) specific lease sales consistent with the five-year
plan, identifying which areas are open to development and
at what pace; (3) exploration plans; and (4) development and
production plans. 22 Each of these steps qualifies as a sepa-
rate agency action that is subject to NEPA. 23 At each step,
the analysis becomes both increasingly detailed and focused,
honing in on the specific activities and areas at issue.
At the time the activities related to the Deepwater Hori-
zon were going through these steps, the U.S. Department of
the Interior's Minerals Management Service ("MMS") was
in charge of ensuring that NEPA was properly applied to
offshore drilling activities. 2 4 In April 2007, MMS released
a programmatic EIS that purported to analyze the potential
region-wide impacts associated with the 2007-2012 Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program. 25 Also in
April 2007, MMS released a final EIS (the Multi-Sale EIS)
for eleven lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico Central and West-
ern Planning Areas, which covered ninety-five million acres,
including the Deepwater Horizon site. 26 A few months later,
in October 2007, MMS issued an EA for Lease Sale 206
within the Central Planning Area.2 7 A Finding of No Signifi-
cant Impact accompanied the EA and concluded that MMS
had no new or different impacts to consider because MMS
had already addressed any potentially significant impacts
associated with Lease Sale 206 in the Multi-Sale EIS.28
Finally, in April 2009, MMS approved BP's drilling plan for
the Deepwater Horizon project without any environmental
review whatsoever. 29 MMS's decision to categorically exclude
the plan from NEPA review implicitly reflects the agency's
conclusion that activities authorized under the plan would
have neither individual nor cumulative effects on the envi-
22. See Sec'y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984) (describing the
four stages for developing an offshore well).
23. See id. (noting that each stage requires "separate regulatory review").
24. See COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS MAN-
AGEMENT SERVICE'S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, PRAC-
TICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-mms-ocs-
nepa.pdf [hereinafter CEQ Report].
25. MINERALS MGMT. SERv., U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED FINAL PRO-
GRAM: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASING PROGRAM (2007), available at
www.boemre.gov/5-year/PDFs/MMSProposedFinalProgram2007-2012.pdf
26. MINERALS MGMT. SERv., U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, GULF OF MEXICO OSC
OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES: 2007-2012, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT (2007), available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-
018-Voll.pdf [hereinafter FINAL EIS].
27. MINERALS MGMT. SERv., U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED GULF OF
MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 206, CENTRAL PLANNING AREA, ENvi-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2007), available at http:// www.gomr.boemre.gov/
PDFs/2007/2007-059.pdf.
28. Id. at 23-24.
29. See NATL COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER
AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 82 (2011) [hereinafter DEEP WA-
TER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER]; Jeffrey Jones & JeffMason, RPTBP's US Gulf
Project Exempted from Enviro Analysis, REUTERS, May 6, 2010, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2010/05/06/oil-rig-leak-exemption-idUSNO6213344201
0050 6 ?type=marketsNews.
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ronment.30 MMS's implementation of NEPA fell far short of
the statutory goals and requirements by failing to consider
and plan for the worst-case scenario, and by improperly rely-
ing on categorical exclusions and tiered analysis of potential
environmental effects. Each regulatory failure, and how it
contributed to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, is described
in detail below, along with proposals for reform.
IV. Regulatory Failures and Proposed NEPA
Reforms
A. Failure to Consider the Worst-Case Scenario
Catastrophes happen. Consider the eruption of toxic gases
from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, the explo-
sion and radioactive fallout at the Chernobyl nuclear power
plant in Ukraine, and the 2011 Japan tsunami and nuclear
crisis. 1 For Americans, examples closer to home include
the core meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear reac-
tor, the toxic wastes oozing into the playgrounds and homes
of Love Canal, and the levee failures in the wake of Hurri-
cane Katrina.3 2 Even closer to the topic at hand are the 1989
wreck of the Exxon Valdez, which resulted in plumes of oil
that fouled the waters and coasts of Prince William Sound,
and the 1969 blowout at Union Oil's Santa Barbara rig that
poured oil into the Pacific and along the California coast, the
latter of which helped motivate the passage of NEPA." The
likelihood of these events happening may have seemed infini-
tesimally small before the fact, but happen they did. And
the magnitude of resulting harm, particularly on vulnerable
human and ecological communities, was enormous.34
Catastrophes count. The public's perception of risk and
willingness to accept risky activities turns on the under-
standing of hazard characteristics, including the potential for
disaster, the irreversibility of potential impacts, the threats
to future generations, the voluntariness of exposure, and
the overall costs and benefits of the activity in question.3 1 In
each of the events listed above, the identification, disclosure,
and assessment of potential disasters in advance might have
caused the public to oppose-and decisionmakers account-
30. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, 516 DM 15.4(C)(10), (14)
(2004) [hereinafter DOI MANUAL].
31. See, e.g., Jonathan Dressner, Deepwater Horizon, Chernobyl, Bhopal, HIST.
NEWS NETWORK (June 7, 2010), http://hnn.us/articles/127605.html; The Lat-
est offapan's Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Crisis, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar.
30, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-latest-on-
japans-earthquake-tsunami-and-nuclear-crisis/2011/03/30/AF4eyZ3B-story.
html.
32. See id.; Eric R. Pogue, 7he Catastrophe Model ofRisk Regulation and the Regula-
tory Legacy of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv.
463 (2007). For additional information on the Love Canal disaster see Eckardt
C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 1979),
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/Ol.htm. For Three Mile Island,
see NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, available
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf
33. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to "Let's Talk" Legal and Natural Destabi-
lizations and the Future ofRegional Collaboration, 8 NEv. L.J. 811, 819 (2008)
(linking the Santa Barbara oil spill and the enactment of NEPA); Dressner,
supra note 31.
34. See Dressner, supra note 31; Beck, supra note 32; NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM'N, supra note 32.
35. Paul Slovic, Perception ofRisk, 236 Sci. 280, 283-85 (1987).
able to the public to reject-the proposed action, or at least
insist that both people and the environment were protected
to the greatest extent possible.
To promote full disclosure of environmental risks by proj-
ect proponents and meaningful scrutiny by decisionmakers
and the public, the 1978 NEPA regulations issued by CEQ
required federal agencies to include a worst-case analysis
("WCA") of potential catastrophes, along with a discussion
of the probability of occurrence, in their EISs. 3 6 WCA was
not required for every proposed action, but only when infor-
mation regarding potential consequences was unknown. The
regulation provided:
If (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essen-
tial to a reasoned choice among alternatives and is not known
and the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or (2)
the information relevant to adverse impacts is important to
the decision and the means to obtain it are not known (e.g.,
the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art)
the agency shall weigh the need for the action against the
risk and severity of possible adverse impacts were the action
to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds,
it shall include a worst case analysis and an indication of the
probability or improbability of its occurrence. 7
According to CEQs guidance on NEPA implementation,
the WCA "should also include a spectrum of events of higher
probability but less drastic impact."38 CEQ explained that
"one of the federal government's most important obligations
is to present to the fullest extent possible the spectrum of
consequences that may result from agency decisions, and
the details of their potential consequences for the human
environment."3 9
By forcing the agency to consider the risk and severity of
possible, yet uncertain, catastrophic effects, the 1978 regu-
lation provided the decisionmaker with the necessary tools
to evaluate and balance the need for the action against the
risks of moving forward. 40 Rather than jumping blindly into
the unknown, industries and agencies alike had to face the
uncertainties related to their proposals, reveal those uncer-
tainties to the public, and consider scenarios involving low
probability but high-impact events that might occur during
the life of a project. Armed with this knowledge, the public
could assess the merits of the project and provide meaningful
input to the decisionmaker.
Despite the importance of worst-case scenario analysis,
CEQ rescinded the WCA requirement in 1986 and replaced
it with a new, watered-down regulation.4 1 CEQ defended this
36. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,984 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1978)).
37. Id
38. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQs National Environmental
PolicyAct Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (Mar. 23, 1981).
39. Id
40. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F2d 957, 973-75, 984 (5th Cir.1983) (uphold-
ing the 1978 WCA regulation as applied to permits for a deepwater port and
oil distribution system, and requiring the Corps to prepare a WCA for a mas-
sive spill in the Gulf); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 E2d 1240, 1245-46
(9th Cir. 1984) (invalidating a WCA that assumed that at some point it would
become clear that no health effect would result from herbicide spraying in view
of agencys admission that no level of exposure had been proven safe).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) (amended 1986).
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policy change by arguing that the WCA requirement called
for mere conjecture, and was therefore ineffective as a deci-
sionmaking tool.42 Moreover, CEQ posited that including
WCA in NEPA analyses was "an unsatisfactory approach" 43
that would mislead the public with "endless hypothesis and
speculation."4 4 Several members of the U.S. Senate Commit-
tee on Environment and Public Works disagreed, and told
CEQ that rescinding the WCA requirement would weaken
NEPA's informational benefits.4 5 However, CEQ dismissed
these concerns, and when environmental groups challenged
the new regulation, the Supreme Court deferred to CEQ and
upheld the new regulation.4 6
CEQ had it precisely backwards when it amended the
WCA regulation in 1986: it is the failure to disclose and ana-
lyze all potential environmental effects-especially in the
face of uncertainty-that is misleading. Without the benefit
of WCA, it is impossible for the public and the agency to
assess the true costs and risks of a project and to compare
them to the project's purported benefits. Likewise, without
the necessary information, it is equally impossible for the
agency and the regulated industry to prepare effectively for
disaster through emergency response plans and other mea-
sures. Moreover, the inclusion of WCA in an EIS can benefit
the decisionmaking process in other ways, such as by high-
lighting opportunities for mitigation or by stimulating ongo-
ing monitoring of potential trouble spots during the life of
the project.
In the case of Deepwater Horizon, the industry and the
agency failed to consider the "devastating sequence of equip-
ment failures" that were clearly foreseeable but thought
unlikely.4 7 BP's own exploration plan, approved by MMS in
2009, minimized the danger of a spill: "it is unlikely that
an accidental oil spill release would occur from the pro-
posed activities."48 Although BP acknowledged that, if a
spill occurred, it could impact wetlands and beaches, it dis-
missed the significance of those potential impacts: "due to
the distance to shore (48 miles) and the response capabilities
that would be implemented, no significant adverse impacts
are expected."49 A proper WCA would have required BP
and MMS to consider and plan for these exigencies, even
if the risk of a significant spill seemed remote, and would
have provided other federal, state, and local governments and
42. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,620 (1986).
43. Proposed Rule, Council on Environmental Quality 50 Fed. Reg. 32,234-01
(Aug. 9, 1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502).
44. Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,620 (1986).
45. Valerie M. Fogleman, Worst CaseAnalyses: A Continued Requirement Under the
National Environmental Policy Act?, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 53, 56 (1987).
46. Robertson v. MethowValley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356, 359 (1989).
47. See DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 29, at 122-26 (describ-
ing industry failures to assess or prepare for potential technology failures); Jeff
Donn, H. Josef Hebert & Mitch Weiss, Emerging Oil Rig Evidence Shows Lack
ofRegulation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 13, 2010, http://www.businessweek.
com/ap/financialnews/D9FM30HOO.htm.
48. BP EXPLORATION & PROD., INC., INITIAL EXPLORATION PLAN: MISSISSIPPI
CANYON BLOCK 252, at 14-3 (2009), available at http://www.biologicaldiver-
sity.org/programs/publiclands/energy/dirty-energy-development/oil and
gas/gulf oil spill/pdfs/Drilliing-plan 2009.pdf [hereinafter BP INITILA Ex-
PLORATION PLAN].
49. Id. at 14-5.
stakeholders with crucial information to facilitate response
planning and implementation.
As it turned out, MMS did not even satisfy the watered-
down replacement for the WCA requirement. The 1986
CEQ regulation requires agencies to analyze "reasonably
foreseeable" consequences, including "impacts which have
catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occur-
rence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is sup-
ported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure
conjecture, and is within the rule of reason." 0 In the BP
case, MMS limited its analysis to the prospect of spills no
larger than 4600 barrels of oil and completely ignored the
risk of a serious spill.1 Further, in assessing the aggregate
risks of all oil and gas drilling in the Gulf, MMS contem-
plated that no more than 21,000 barrels might be spilled over
the entire forty-year life span of the program.5 2 In fact, the
Deepwater Horizon released hundreds of times more than
that-aboutfive million barrels.53
In August 2010, CEQ issued a report on NEPA policies,
practices, and procedures relating to oil and gas explora-
tion and development on the Outer Continental Shelf5 4 It
recommended that the reformed and reorganized MMS,
which is now named the Bureau of Ocean Energy Man-
agement, Regulation and Enforcement ("BOEMRE"), "[e]
nsure that NEPA documents provide decisionmakers with a
robust analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts, including
an analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts associated with
low probability catastrophic spills for oil and gas activities on
the Outer Continental Shelf." " This recommendation, while
a marginal improvement over the watered down 1986 CEQ
regulation, does not go far enough.
CEQ should reinstate the original 1978 WCA regula-
tion in its entirety. Agencies should be compelled to perform
WCA whenever they lack important information regarding
the specific nature and extent of a proposed action's poten-
tial impacts. This analysis should also include an indication
of the probability of the worst-case scenario s occurrence.
Reinstating the WCA requirement is consistent with the
congressional declaration of national policy articulated in
NEPA, which states that agencies have a responsibility to
avoid "unintended" environmental consequences. 6 Requir-
ing WCA would also help fulfill NEPA's twin goals of full
disclosure to the public and fully informed, well reasoned
decisionmaking by the agency.5 7
50. 40 C.ER. § 1502.22 (1986).
51. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, GULF OF MEXICO
OSC OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES: 2007-2012, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 290 (2007), available at http://www.gomr.bo-
emre.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-060.pdf [hereinafter FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS].
52. FINAL EIS, supra note 26, at 4-244.
53. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 3: THE AMOUNT AND FATE OF THE
OIL 18 (2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/Amount-and-Fate-for-
Release/d/38827407. Cf DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note
29, at vi (stating that more than four million barrels were spilled).
54. CEQ Report, supra note 24, at 1.
55. Id. at 2, 4.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006).
57. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
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Considering the worst-case scenario, and airing it publicly,
probably would not have precluded BP's oil lease or the devel-
opment of the Deepwater Horizon. Nonetheless, including
a WCA in the NEPA analysis for the Deepwater Horizon
would have made both the government and the public aware
of the risk involved in drilling in that location. Further, it
would have increased pressure on responsible parties to pre-
pare for this kind of disaster in advance. Faced with the risk of
an oil spill of this magnitude, BP and the government would
be more likely to ensure that the blowout prevention systems
were reliable and that an effective response and containment
plan was in place before the catastrophe occurred. Given that
deepwater development is becoming more pervasive-as of
March 2011, there are 3387 active leases, 1638 approved
drilling applications, and 26 active platforms-requiring
WCA for future development activities is imperative.
B. Taking Shortcuts Through Improper Tiering and
Categorical Exclusions
CEQ regulations authorize agencies to use "categorical exclu-
sions to define categories of actions which do not individu-
ally or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment and which are therefore exempt from require-
ments to prepare an environmental impact statement."" The
exclusion of appropriate categories of actions from NEPA
analysis makes sense. All agencies engage in actions, such
as routine, minor administrative decisions, that legitimately
deserve to be exempt from NEPA. Preparation of an EIS for
such actions would be a pointless exercise, given their nonex-
istent or benign effects.
Over the years, however, some agencies have abused the
use of categorical exclusions by refusing to prepare EISs, or
even EAs, for proposals that would have clearly created a non-
trivial risk of significant effects. 60 Due to excessively broad
application of the categorical exclusion process, many agency
actions that pose serious risks are approved and implemented
without any consideration of their potential environmental
consequences.61 Further, the abuse of the categorical exclu-
sion process allows these actions to proceed without public
input because agencies often fail to provide public notice
before granting categorical exclusions. 62
The BP oil spill illustrates the negative consequences
that can result when agencies abuse categorical exclusions.
58. Offihore Statistics by Water Depth, DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT, http://www.gomr.boemre.
gov/homepg/fastfacts/WaterDepthlWaterDepth.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2011).
59. 40 C.ER. §§ 150 0 .4 (p), 1500.5(k).
60. See Kevin H. Moriarty, Note, Circumventing the NationalEnvironmentalPolicy
Act: Agency Abuse ofthe Categorical Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2312 (2004).
61. See id In its final guidance on the use of categorical exclusions issued in 2010,
CEQ recognized the potential for abuse of the categorical exclusion mecha-
nism. Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Establishing,
Applying, and Revising Categorical Exclusions Under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act , 75 Fed. Reg. 75,631-75,632 (Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter
CEQ Final Guidance].
62. CEQ Final Guidance, supra note 61, at 75,636 (stating that "[m]ost Federal
agencies do not routinely notify the public when they use a categorical exclu-
sion to meet their NEPA responsibilities").
MMS approved BP's development and production plan for
the Deepwater Horizon under a categorical exclusion. 63 As
a result, MMS did not consider the potential environmental
impacts of BP's plan on the immediately surrounding envi-
ronment (Mississippi Canyon block 252). Instead, less than
a month after BP submitted its plan, MMS approved it in a
one-page letter.6 4 The letter made no mention of the environ-
mental risks the plan entailed, noting only that BP should
"[e]xercise caution while drilling due to indications of shal-
low gas and possible water flow."65
In essence, MMS justified its categorical exclusion for BP's
drilling plan on the basis that a NEPA analysis at that stage
in the oil development program would have been duplicative
of those conducted earlier. As explained above, MMS had
conducted NEPA analyses at previous stages in the develop-
ment of BP's Deepwater Horizon project, including a pro-
grammatic EIS purporting to analyze the potential regional
impacts of the nationwide five-year oil and gas develop-
ment plan, an EIS covering the Central Planning Area, and
a supplemental EA for Lease Sale 206, of which the Deep-
water Horizon project was a part.66 These assessments con-
cluded that the sale would have no significant environmental
impacts.67
The use of earlier analyses to substitute for more complete
environmental evaluation of subsequent projects or project
phases is known as "tiering."6 Tiering is intended to avoid
duplicative analysis. If an agency has prepared an EIS on a
broad program, there may be no need to repeat the analysis
when it later considers individual projects that are compo-
nents of the broader program. Tiering is justified, however,
only when the potential effects of individual implement-
ing actions have been fully considered at the programmatic
stage.6 1 Often it is impossible to engage in informed analy-
sis of the effects of individual projects at the programmatic
stage because the location or circumstances of those projects
are not yet known.70 In such cases, reliance on a program-
63. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
64. Letter from Michael Tolbert, on behalf of the Reg'1 Supervisor of Field Op-
erations, Mineral Mgmt. Serv., Dep't of the Interior, to Scherie Douglas, BP
Exploration & Prod. Inc. (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://mardjokic.com/
Website%20Files/BP%20Deep%20Horizon%20Permit%20MMS%20Ap-
proval.pdf
65. Id.
66. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED GULF
or MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 206, CENTRAL PLANNING AREA,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2007), available at http:// www.gomr.boemre.
gov/PDFs/2007/2007-059.pdf.
67. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
68. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1986).
69. See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989,
997 (9' Cir. 2004) (finding tiered analyses flawed due to failure to include
specific information on cumulative effects).
70. One district court explained that:
Because programmatic statements are primarily concerned with
analyzing the cumulative or synergistic environmental impacts of a
program as a whole, they generally are unable to reflect a considered
analysis of the particularized aspects of individual federal actions. Yet
such analysis of particularized aspects of individual federal actions
must be performed under the mandate of section 102(2)(C). Thus,
"site-specific" EIS's will usually be necessary to supplement the envi-
ronmental analysis of a programmatic impact statement.
NRDC v. Adm'r, Energy Research and Dev. Admin., 451 E Supp. 1245, 1258
(D.D.C. 1978), affdin relevantpartsub nom. NRDC v. U.S. Nuclear Regula-
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matic EIS to justify the exclusion of individual projects from
subsequent NEPA analysis disguises the agency's failure to
ever consider site-specific, project-level effects, even if they
are pote ntially catastrophic.
The categorical exclusion used to approve BP's develop-
ment and production plan appears in a Department of the
Interior manual governing the application of NEPA to MMS
agency actions that occur later in the OCSLA development
program.7 1 The range of actions excluded by the manual is
remarkable, from environmentally innocuous actions such as
"approval of Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells" to those
with the potential to create major environmental disruption,
such as "[a]pproval of an offshore lease or unit exploration[,]
development/production plan or a Development Operation
Coordination Document in the central or western Gulf of
Mexico." 72 The latter exclusion covered BP's plan.73
Even a cursory look at MMS's invocation of the categori-
cal exclusion for the Deepwater Horizon plan shows that the
tiering of NEPA analyses is inappropriate in the context of
approving drilling plans. MMS used the exclusion, coupled
with tiering, to sweep the potential risks of drilling a deep-
water well in that location under the rug.
The previous EISs and EA were flawed because they relied
on unrealistically optimistic assumptions about the likeli-
hood of an oil spill and the industry's capability to contain
one if it occurred. The programmatic EIS analyzed the pos-
sibility of only one spill of about 4600 barrels of oil and other
smaller spills, and MMS assumed that no more than 26,500
barrels could be spilled into the Central Planning Area for
the entire forty-year duration of the oil and gas development
program.74 Equally damning, BP's 2009 regional spill plan is
riddled with meaningless boilerplate instead of careful analy-
sis.75 For example, it lists walruses, sea lions, and seals as "sen-
sitive biological resources" in the Gulf.76 It is true that the
blowout did not, in fact, affect any of these creatures, because
none of them resides anywhere near the Guf77 One can only
assume that the language was lifted from Arctic or Pacific
plans. Somehow no one in charge noticed the discrepancy or
drew the obvious conclusion that the inapposite references
tory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Cf Salmon River Concerned
Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994) (approving programmatic
EIS on vegetation control during reforestation projects, but allowing the For-
est Service to defer consideration of cumulative impacts to site-specific impact
statements only on the ground that the agency would be estopped from argu-
ing later that it need not consider cumulative impacts in the context of specific
herbicide applications).
71. DOI MANUAL, supra note 30, at 516 DM 15.4(C)(10), (14) (2004).
72. Id.
73. This categorical exclusion is a slight modification of an exclusion adopted by
the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") when it supervised offshore drilling.
USGS provided no explanation as to why these actions should be categorically
excluded. Notice of Final Revised Instructions, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,485, 7,486-87
(Jan. 23, 1981) (regarding implementing procedures for NEPA).
74. See FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, supra note 51, at 290; FINAL EIS, supra note 26,
at 4-243.
75. See Andrew Clark, BP Contingency Plan for Dealing With Oil Spill Was Rid-
died With Errors, THE GUARDIAN, June 9, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/jun/09/bp-oil-spill-contingency-plan/print.
76. Id; see generally BP GULF OF MExico REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN,
sec. 11, fig. 11-3 (2000), available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/BP-
GoMspillresponseplan.pdf
77. See Andrew Clark, supra note 75.
were indicative of a poorly performed cut-and-paste job,
rather than the careful, site-specific environmental analysis
that NEPA demands. In and of itself, this was a fatal defect
in the analysis.78 As the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling noted
in its 2011 report to the President, "[a]s applied by MMS,
tiering was not always consistent with its original purposes:
instead, it created a system where deeper environmental anal-
ysis at more geographically targeted and advanced planning
stages did not always take place."7 1 Professor Oliver Houck's
metaphor vividly describes the problem:
[T]he environmental reviews that accompanied these deci-
sions resembled a stack of babushka dolls, each couching a
smaller one, each painted identically and saying the same
misleading thing. In the dance that followed ... something
ironic and ultimately deadly happened: the NEPA pro-
cess not only failed its mission to enlighten critical 0[uter]
C[ontinental] S[helf] decisions, it obfuscated and in the end
undercut them."
The whitewashing of the prospect of a significant spill,
and its effects on the Gulf ecosystem, makes the agency's
reliance on a categorical exclusion for BP's plan impossible to
justify. The agency simply accepted at face value, without any
independent evaluation or verification, BP's dubious asser-
tions that:
* Site specific environmental conditions have been taken
into account for the proposed activities and no impacts
are expected as a result of these conditions;1
* Due to the distance to shore (forty-eight miles) and
response capabilities, no significant effects on wetlands
are expected;8 2
* Any unanticipated blowout resulting in a spill is
unlikely to have an impact based on industry wide
standards for using proven equipment and response
technologies;83 and
* In the event of a spill, only "sub-lethal" effects on fish
and marine mammals would occur.84
Remarkably, the drilling plan admits that "[n]o alterna-
tives to the proposed activities were considered to reduce
environmental impacts" and that "[n]o agencies or persons
were consulted regarding potential impacts associated with
the proposed activities."
78. See NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (remanding the
Department of Interior's EIS for the outer continental shelf leasing program
in the Pacific and Alaskan regions for failure to assess the cumulative impact
of development on migratory species, and holding that perfunctory boilerplate
style references do not constitute adequate analysis under NEPA).
79. DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 29, at 260.
80. Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought
to be a Law, 4o ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11033, 11037 (2010).
81. BP INITIAL EXPLORATION PLAN, supra note 48, at 14-2 to -4.
82. Id. at 14-6.
83. Id. at 14-4.
84. Id. at 14-3 to -4.
85. Id. at 14-12.
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If ever a project were unsuitable for categorical exclusion,
this was it. Indeed, MMS's own manual explicitly prohib-
ited the use of exclusions for facilities "[i]n areas of ... rela-
tively untested deep water, or remote areas, . . . or areas of
high biological sensitivity; . . . or utilizing new or unusual
technology."8 6
MMS at least needed to justify why the manual's bar on
categorical exclusions for offshore oil and gas projects in "rela-
tively untested deep water," "areas of high biological sensitiv-
ity," or when the projects used "new or untested technology"
did not preclude the issuance of a categorical exclusion for
the Deepwater Horizon. Similarly, both CEQ and Depart-
ment of the Interior regulations preclude a categorical exclu-
sion if "extraordinary circumstances" exist. 7 These include
actions with significant impacts on public health or safety,
significant impacts on natural resources such as wetlands,
highly uncertain and potentially significant environmental
effects or unique or unknown environmental risks, a direct
relationship to other actions with individually insignificant
but cumulatively significant environmental effects, or sig-
nificant impacts on endangered or threatened species." A
drilling project such as the Deepwater Horizon raised serious
questions in each of those areas.
Since the blowout, the government has begun exploring
possible changes in the use of categorical exclusions for oil
and gas development." CEQs 2010 report on MMS's com-
pliance with NEPA in connection with administration of its
offshore drilling program recommends that BOEMRE "[r]
eview the use of categorical exclusions for Outer Continen-
tal Shelf oil and gas exploration and development in light of
the increasing levels of complexity and risk-and the con-
sequent potential environmental impacts-associated with
deepwater drilling [and] [d]etermine whether to revise these
categorical exclusions." 0
Several months after BP capped the Deepwater Horizon
well,91 CEQ issued new, generally applicable guidance on cat-
egorical exclusions.9 2 According to CEQ the expanded use of
categorical exclusions "underscor[es] the need for ... guid-
ance" about their promulgation and use." Categorical exclu-
sions are no longer the rare exception to the need for NEPA
compliance, but "the most frequently employed method of
complying with NEPA." 4 Significantly, the guidance rec-
ognizes that "[i]f used inappropriately, categorical exclusions
can thwart NEPA's environmental stewardship goals, by
compromising the quality and transparency of agency envi-
ronmental review and . . . the opportunity for meaningful
public participation and review."
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
DOI MANUAL, supra note 71 at § 15.4(C)(10).
40 CER. § 1508.4 (1986); 43 C.ER. § 46.215 (2011).
40 C.ER. § 1508.27. For an analysis of Endangered Species Act ("ESA") is-
sues, and how reliance on flawed NEPA analyses undercut the efficacy of ESA
consultations, see FLOURNOY ET AL., supra note *, at 38-42.
75 Fed. Reg. 29,996 (May 28, 2010).
CEQ Report, supra note 24, at 5.
Times Topics: GulfofMexico Oil Spill, supra note 1 (finding well capped in July
2010).
CEQ Final Guidance, supra note 61.
Id. at 75,632.
Id.
Id.
CEQs guidance includes worthy changes that confine
categorical exclusions to the narrow circumstances for which
they were envisioned-proposed actions that have no pros-
pect of creating significant environmental effects and for
which environmental assessment would provide no useful
information. The guidance provides that agencies considering
a new exclusion gather and evaluate information, 6 as well as
issue findings to support any conclusion that the excluded
activities will not result in significant environmental effects,
either individually or cumulatively. 7 Agencies must similarly
document the application of existing categorical exclusions,
and provide supporting analysis for why an exclusion is not
barred by extraordinary circumstances." The guidance also
provides that agencies should periodically review existing
exclusions to ensure that the predictions of minimal envi-
ronmental effects on which they were based have turned out
to be accurate, that circumstances have not changed so as
to demand revocation of or limitations on those exclusions,
and that unanticipated extraordinary circumstances have not
occurred in connection with excluded projects." All of these
revisions should help avoid egregious applications of categori-
cal exclusions such as the one MMS approved for the Deep-
water Horizon. Indeed, the guidance specifically uses MMS's
application of categorical exclusions to deepwater drilling as
an example of when evolving conditions, the discovery of
new risks, and the use of new technologies undercuts the jus-
tification for pre-existing categorical exclusions. 00
The guidance, however, does not go far enough to ensure
public involvement when agencies resort to categorical exclu-
sions. Although CEQ has "strongly encourage[d] public
involvement in the establishment and revision of categori-
cal exclusions,"o it has done less to assure such involvement
in the application of categorical exclusions. CEQ instead
emphasized the need for agency flexibility in determining the
appropriate level of public engagement. Indeed, the guidance
acknowledges that "[m]ost federal agencies do not routinely
notify the public when they use a categorical exclusion,"
however "[t]here are some circumstances ... [in which] the
public may be able to provide an agency with valuable infor-
mation, such as whether a proposal involves extraordinary
circumstances or potentially significant cumulative impacts
that can help the agency decide whether to apply a categori-
cal exclusion."102 Public engagement should be the norm, not
the exception. The default position should require agencies to
notify and seek input from the public on the application of a
categorical exclusion, with the agency bearing the burden of
justifying a failure to do so. In any event, BOEMRE should
exercise the discretion afforded it by the guidance to make
public notification and comment solicitation a routine part
of the application of any categorical exclusions to offshore
drilling activities.
96. Id at 75,633.
97. Id. at 75,634.
98. Id. at 75,636.
99. Id. at 75,636-37.
100. Id. at 75,637.
101. Id. at 75,629.
102. Id. at 75,636 (emphasis added).
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CEQguidance also addresses the value of having an agency
proposing a categorical exclusion seek input from other agen-
cies with relevant expertise. The preamble to the guidance pro-
vides that agencies "should consider information and records
from . .. other Federal agencies that have experience with
the actions covered in a proposed categorical exclusion."1 03
Again, however, this recommendation is not binding, and
the lead agency retains the right to determine whether and
what kind of inter-agency consultation in which it is will-
ing to engage. This recommendation does not go far enough.
Absent a compelling justification to the contrary, before the
Department of the Interior uses a categorical exclusion for an
offshore drilling activity it should solicit the views of agencies
that have expertise in the aquatic environment, such as the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Further, when an expert
agency opposes a categorical exclusion, there should be a pre-
sumption against its creation. The presumption would shift
the burden to the proposing agency to demonstrate both that
the project would not, individually or cumulatively, have sig-
nificant effects and that no extraordinary circumstances exist
that would make the use of an exclusion inappropriate. In all
likelihood, it would be very difficult to rebut the presump-
tion for a deepwater drilling project. In its 2011 Report to the
President, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling stated that "in the
aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, it is difficult to
argue that deepwater drilling is an activity that does not pres-
ent at least some potentially significant risk of harm to the
environment of the Gulf."0 4
If MMS had done a better job at the NEPA analyses, and
if it had actually analyzed the drilling plan instead of cat-
egorically excluding it from analysis, would it have made a
difference? It is reasonable to think the answer is yes. MMS
is authorized to allow the exploration stage to proceed only
if it finds that the lessee's plan "will not be unduly harmful
to aquatic life in the area, result in pollution, create hazard-
ous or unsafe conditions, unreasonably interfere with other
uses of the area, or disturb any site, structure, or object of
historical or archeological significance." 1 Subsequently, at
the development and production stage, MMS is expected to
review an additional, detailed plan.10 6 IfMMS finds that "the
plan would probably cause serious harm or damage to life
(including fish and other aquatic life) . . . or to the marine,
coastal or human environments," the plan shall be disap-
proved and the lease may be terminated.10 7 If BP and MMS
had taken a hard look at the potential for harm to humans,
aquatic life, and the surrounding environment, the Deepwa-
ter Horizon plan might not have been approved.
103. Id. at 75,629.
104. DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER, supra note 29, at 260.
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(g)(3) (2006).
106. 43 U.S.C. §1351(c).
107. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1)(D), (j).
C. Agency Capture and NEPA
The "captive agency" theory-first enunciated in 1955 by
Professor Marver Bernstein-postulates that federal agencies
have a tendency to move so far in the direction of accom-
modating the interests of the entities they are charged with
regulating that ultimately those agencies may fairly be seen
as a "captive" of the regulated entities.08 The theory views
regulators as subject to unique pressures and influences
which invariably push their actions and policies in a direc-
tion favored by regulated firms and away from the public's
best interests.'09 Among other things, the theory posits that
captive agencies tend to be unduly passive, ponderous, and
inefficient, failing to enforce regulatory requirements with
needed vigor and enthusiasm.no
MMS's inattentive-if not disdainful-implementation
of NEPA, in the context of its hasty approval of BP's plans for
the Deepwater Horizon, supports this theory. MMS freely
accepted BP's blanket assurances that the environmental
risks were either minimal or non-existent."' One can safely
assume that this uncritical acceptance of BP's assessment had
something to do with MMS's desire to promote the expan-
sion of oil and gas development in the Gulf. As a result,
MMS's failure to take NEPA seriously flouted the statute's
directive to have unbiased, responsible officials analyze and
weigh the potential consequences of federal actions-includ-
ing the granting of federal leases, licenses, and permits for
private activities.112
Since the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the executive
branch has taken steps to address agency capture within the
Department of the Interior by creating BOEMRE and by
dividing up some of the duties formerly held by MMS.H3
Previously, MMS had three different jobs: it was a "cheer-
leader" charged with promoting the development of offshore
oil drilling; it was a revenue collector; and it oversaw the
safety of drilling operations. 1 4 Testimony before a 2010 U.S.
Senate subcommittee on the vagaries of agency capture con-
cluded that, "[a]gainst [MMS's] conflict-ridden backdrop, it
is unsurprising that the agency gave short shrift to its safety
mission.""' The implementation of mechanisms, or "met-
rics," that maintain focus on an agency's core statutory mis-
sion and encourage consistent oversight by an independent
watchdog could help prevent capture and the kind of regula-
108. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIS-
SION 3-4 (1955). A seminal article on "agency capture" in the legal scholarship
is Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1713 (1975).
109. See Stewart, supra note 108, at 1715.
110. See id. at 1681-86.
111. See supra Part IV.B.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
113. See Order of the Secretary of the Interior No. 3299 (May 19, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/
getfile&PagelD= 32475.
114. See Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat ofAgency Capture:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School).
115. Id.
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tory failures that happened here.11 6 In addition, reforming
the NEPA process to ensure that worst-case scenarios are dis-
closed and analyzed and to preclude the improvident use of
categorical exclusions and tiering is an additional step that
must be taken to mitigate the pressure placed on the regula-
tory agency. "7
V. Conclusion
The Deepwater Horizon tragedy highlights the need for
significant legal reforms. In the aftermath of the blowout,
BOEMRE has begun to develop another EIS to supplement
the NEPA analyses for the Central and Western Planning Area
Lease Sales in the 2007-2012 Outer Continental Shelf Pro-
gram.ns It pledges to consider new circumstances and infor-
mation arising from the blowout. According to BOEMRE,
the supplemental analysis "will focus on updating the base-
line conditions and potential environmental effects of oil and
natural gas leasing, exploration, development, and produc-
tion" in the Gulf."' BOEMRE should take full advantage
of this opportunity to remedy the shortcomings of MMS's
past practices. BOEMRE should fully assess the worst-case
scenarios of leasing activities, the potential direct and indi-
rect effects of catastrophic oil spills on human and ecological
communities, and the cumulative effects of ongoing and new
activities in the Gulf. Moreover, CEQ should require agen-
cies such as BOEMRE to perform worst-case analyses and
to open themselves to more regular and robust criticism by
other government agencies and stakeholders-other than the
agency with primary responsibility for that project-so that
all potential risks of harm will be identified and analyzed in
a rigorous, accurate, and unbiased manner.
116. See Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary,111th Cong. 13-14 (2010) (statement of Sidney A.
Shapiro, University Distinguished Chair in Law, Associated Dean for Research
and Development, Wake Forest Law School, and Member Scholar, Vice-Presi-
dent, Center for Progressive Reform) (describing how systematic oversight and
the use of positive metrics could alleviate agency capture); Sidney Shapiro &
Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEx. L. REV.
1741, 1769-70 (2008).
117. See supra Part IVA, .B.
118. Notice of Intent to Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement,
75 Fed. Reg. 69,122, 69,122 (Nov. 10, 2010).
119. Id.
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